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Forging the Iron or Chasing the Wind? New Challenges to Europe's Governance

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Take-away proposition:

For a variety of reasons, the European Union (EU) has become most unpopular with her Member States, peoples and citizens. This is not merely due to the fallout from the financial and euro crises, but rather because the Union suffers from self-inflicted damage resulting from its contested goals and governance of the past. Both have been overcome by new realities. In order to be prepared for the challenges of the future, deep-running changes will have to be considered and paradigm shifts will be required: away from 'bureaucratism' towards citizens' preferences, away from the 'routinism' of the Community method towards 'innovationism', away from walking the beaten tracks towards new paths of revised principles and fluid structures of decision-making.

The challenge: Swing of the pendulum or disintegration?

That the EU is currently in crisis is a truism. But much more so, Europe may also be in persistent decline. Be that as it may, what is certain is that Europe finds itself today in a morose state! As Jean-Claude Juncker so aptly observed: 'The EU of today is not exactly the embodiment of attractiveness. We are in crisis, not just any crisis but the deepest crisis of the EU ever.'[1]

It goes without saying that the origins of the crisis are to do with the still-lingering, far-reaching, economic downfall of several Member States of the EU in the wake of the global economic and financial troubles of 2008–2012 (Gretschmann, 2009). However, this is only one side of the coin. In addition,

the European project itself seems to be losing its attractiveness both for the citizens and the peoples of Europe. A crisis of our self-conception, self-assertion and self-commitments has emerged.

Actually, European integration reflects the political power of an intellectual idea and ideal, which Rifkin has termed *The European Dream* (Rifkin, 2004).

According to Hassemer, the *eigenvalue* of this ideal is currently being blindsided: the EU stands in for the rule of law, political and social participation, liberty, human and civil rights, freedom of speech, equality of the sexes and non-discrimination, religious freedom, discursive conflict settlement, economic prosperity and so on (Hassemer, 2014).

Nonetheless, today we are confronted with strong anti-European sentiment and euro-scepticism, which gives us reason to ask whether we may have propelled the EU ahead too rapidly, in the wrong direction and with quite some 'overstretch'. We may have lost the European citizens, voters and taxpayers. Against this background, and in spite of the common good,[2] Europe has progressed on the way to an ever-closer Union; European integration does not seem to be a stable trend any longer.

Admittedly, Europe has never been unitary, or rather collaborative in character, its 'wealth' lying not only in economic gains but also in the variety of cultures, lifestyles and polities it encompasses. Most recently, however, new divergences and cleavages have arisen as the economic crisis has hit each Member State differently. This has laid bare divergent national interests, preferences and constraints. In solving the crisis, Europe's leaders are not currently singing from the same hymn sheet. In a sense, we are still 'an incomplete union on the way to an unknown destination', as Weiler put it many years ago (Weiler, 1999).

However, one may argue that today's situation is neither unique nor singular. Indeed, the process of European integration – although path-dependent – has never been unilinear and equicontinuous.

EU integration has always been characterised by the choreography of a swinging pendulum: rash, deep and broad integration was regularly followed by a sobering of integration efforts. Over-integration has often led (through feedback and reactions by those affected) to under-integration or, to say the least, to a considerable slowdown in the integration process. Disruptions and new challenges have often forced national political leaders to conclude that the advantages of integration can no longer balance out the costs of not having nationally coherent and preferred policies in accordance with the preferences of their national constituencies.

Fundamentally, states seek to increase their power in international economic relations to create conditions that minimise the costs of pursuing their domestic economic priorities in an interdependent world. Their policy choices are conditioned by the constraints and opportunities they face in the international environment.

International interdependence provides both costs and opportunities for all actors involved. The main benefit of interdependence is the welfare gain that results from a more efficient allocation of resources. The foremost price of interdependence is a relative loss in national decision-making autonomy. Under the conditions of interdependence, the ability of a government to pursue its own domestic priorities is constrained by external forces over which it has little or no control. These costs of interdependence, however, are asymmetrical among the various participants. In other words, states possess different degrees of power to adjust to external pressures or to change the international environment under which they operate.

The preferred option of states would be to push the costs of adjustment onto other actors in the system and to reduce domestic costs. Governments can control domestic conditions only if they can influence the decisions taken in other countries. Thus, states want to avoid or constrain negative externalities of other governments' pursuits of domestic (economic) priorities. The rationale behind these developments is the growing interconnectedness of the global world that makes us feel the often unintended (side-)effects of the actions of others more directly and immediately. Such 'externalities' are changing the boundaries between domestic and international politics and are eroding the traditional modes of governance.

Yet, today's reality is even more complex: after more than 60 years of EU development, some consider the achieved stability as path-dependent or even irreversible, whereas others think that in the face of the crises we may well require 'more Europe'. Others again have observed a 'game changer': Wessels has elaborated the proposition that the 'Nation States' themselves changed their character once they became members of the Union. A self-binding assimilation and symbiosis – he calls it 'fusion' – between Member States and EU institutions has taken place (Wessels, 1997). However, this fusion has entailed a loss of legitimacy on the side of the national electorates. National policymakers are no longer seen fit to solve social, economic and political problems as they are constrained by Brussels in their policy choices.

Helpless, hopeless, aimless and erratic – this is how the EU presents itself today. The trust and confidence of Europe's citizens have been shattered for quite some time, as they experience their elected representatives as driven by the crisis and by European regulations, interdictions and vetoes. The national representatives are no longer at the helm or steering wheel deciding relevant courses and directions. This implies a feeling of being at someone else's mercy and entails a frustration leading to euro-scepticism. Seventy percent of the European population holds serious doubts as to whether European politicians are able to solve any of the most pressing problems. Europe appears to suffer from a lack of finality, problem-solving capacity, varying degrees of freedom and integration fatigue.

Moreover, enlargement of the Union, a politically most desirable but economically difficult process has not contributed to a more homogeneous and cooperative Europe. Enlargement has added significantly to the level of disagreement between Member States. Rather than being able to create a collective sense of belonging, a broad basis for common beliefs, objectives and policies, the veto power of individual players has grown and multiplied and the benefits of togetherness have started to decline. It is not the sheer number of countries being members of the Union today but rather the drastic increase in heterogeneity and national interest which has made it difficult to mediate and compromise. Policy gridlock often results.

The upshot is a tendency towards 'disintegration'. A most recent book, edited by Eppler and Scheller, has mapped out these tendencies and explained the reasons and origins of disintegration.[3] The 'permissive consensus'[4] which had characterised the transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level over decades has vanished. Europe seems to have lost a large part of its attractiveness due to the arrogance, over-ambition, self-interest and insufficient self-criticism of its most ardent proponents.

The background: Self-inflicted damage

Paraphrasing the title of Giddens' new book,[5] the Europe of today is not mighty, but it is turbulent. The EU is characterised by disillusions and divisions, by conflicts and complaints; the project is in jeopardy and its foundations are shaken up. Some scholars argue it has been a *Fatah Morgana* all along. No, it has not: Its origins, original governance techniques, distribution of power and influence and relative homogeneity of interests (with six, then nine and later 12 Member States) made it a relatively well-balanced undertaking in the early years. The then prevailing system of governance, the *method Monnet*,[6] was adequate and well suited to its problems. This seems to have changed quite drastically in recent years. The way the Union is shaped, promoted, steered and governed may no longer be matched to the new challenges and forces at work. In the past it was possible to push the 'frontiers and limits' of integration rather than to respect them. Today the reverse holds true: We will have to respect the limits, to go slow in order not to lose legitimacy but rather re-gain it with the citizens and peoples of Europe.

This is easier said than done, though, since the grand ideas, projects, designs and visions are lacking.

Rather than focusing on such grand issues and on correcting the framework conditions of national policymaking, the EU has over the past ten years lost her grand thinking and has slipped into regulating the 'small things of everyday life' (Bittner, 2010).

Is it really the principal task of the Union to determine and decide which fuel we fill into our tanks, which kind of chocolate we eat, which light bulbs we buy, how much water we flush down our toilets or what type of ladder we are allowed to climb?

For the normal citizen this smells of undue prohibition, intervention into our private lives, bureaucratic paternalism and an erroneous sense of mission by those in distant Brussels. The political and social value added of an ever-closer Union thus dissolves into thin air! Integration is losing its legitimacy, while paternalism prevails. The impression is created that Europe strives for imposing rules by decree from above.

Jean-Claude Juncker once described the governance style of the Union in candid clarity: 'We first decide on something, than we hang it out and wait what happens. If no outcry or outright revolt follows, because most of the political actors and citizens affected do not understand what was decided, then we move ahead step by step until the decision is irreversible.'[7] How large one may find the distance between the citizens of Europe who are subjects of such decisions and those who take the decisions back in Brussels?

No wonder many citizens are worried about a European project that has no limits or boundaries.

As of late, the EU Commission President, Barroso, French Commissioner, Barnier, and others have argued in favour of trimming the EU red tape and limiting its hyper-activism. 'I strongly believe the EU should not meddle in everything that happens in Europe', Barroso said, adding that decisions had to be taken 'closer to the citizens'. Reflections have started on 'a cultural change in the way the EU works' and the Commission insists that they have become more mindful of the costs to businesses and citizens when considering regulations.

Two reasons, in particular, explain the Member States' diminishing confidence in the Commission. Member States argue that the Commission proposes too many detailed rules, particularly in areas such as the environment, food safety and social policy. Under its *status quo* governance structure, the EU has turned into a legislative machinery trying to interpret her fields of competence evermore widely. Ceaselessly, the Commission is working on weaving an ever-closer web of harmonised European laws and regulations – the result thereof, the '*acquis communautaire*', is presently estimated to comprise some 100,000 printed pages.

Indeed, under the old governance system, the Community method,[8] the Commission defined its main task and assignment to advance the process and the amount of European norm-production and legislation. Most, if not all, of the 28 Commissioners and their Directorates-General legitimise their own existence by continuously rolling out new initiatives in order to win a high-profile – both inside the institutions and in general – press coverage. As we know from organisational sociology, it is the interest of any organisation in itself which determines the ways and means of its workings and operations. Therefore, the process of European integration and governance lacks the property of self-correction.

Moreover, there are two major forces behind integration; they are ideals and interests. However, their share in pushing integration is not balanced and varies significantly over time. As we know from economic psychology, ideals tend to dominate in periods of economic well-being, high growth rates and stable political situations, in which certainty and security prevail; whereas interests become the predominant force in situations of instability, economic slowdown, unemployment crises and so on. The advantage of ideals over interests is, as Thomas Shelling has put it, the self-binding function: in the pursuit of ideals, people are inclined to act even beyond their narrow self-interest. When it comes to interests playing the major role, there seems to be less leeway for visions: only if there is interest mediation and positive gains for those involved will agents stick to treaties and contracts. If interests cannot be made compatible, agents will start to defect. It seems to be quite obvious that due to the many elements of instability and uncertainty arising, resulting from lower than expected growth rates in the coming years, interest may further dominate over ideals. This equally affects citizens, voters and taxpayers, on the one hand, and institutional actors such as public authorities, administrations and states, on the other hand.

Against this backdrop, the EU may be likened to Icarus, the character in Greek mythology who was trying to fly higher and higher by means of wings constructed from feathers and wax. When he was flying too close to the Sun, the melting wax made him fall into the sea where he drowned – a tragic example of hubris or failed ambition![9]

The critical choice: Forging the iron or chasing the wind

Whenever Europeanists argue in favour of business as usual, *viz* the Community/Monnet methods leading to a federal Europe, and that we may need much more of this very approach today, it may be 'continuity in misapprehension'. Europe has changed quite drastically throughout the five decades of the last century on the way to the Europe of today. Therefore, Europe will have to put an end to its illusions or the illusions will put an end to the Europe as we know it.

Whereas over the past 60 years or so the kind of governance deployed both by EU institutions and Member States in driving integration ahead was like the forging of an iron, like a piece of raw metal put into fire in order to shape it and hammer it out, today's and tomorrow's EU may no longer be interpreted as solid material taking shape but rather as an elusive, fluid, intangible, incalculable state of matter lacking consistence as it may modify itself (like in physics) by means of temperature or pressure.

Governing such an EU will be more like chasing and catching the wind, blowing from and to different directions, at different heights, sometimes as a storm, sometimes as a katabatic wind and so on.

As Kohler-Koch and Rittberger have observed convincingly, in the course of the past decade, a plethora of analyses have conceived of the EU as a system of complex governance (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006).

Notably, 'new modes of governance' (NMGs) have been interpreted as a reaction to the imminent risk of deadlock in Union decision-making and as a means to cope with a loss of legitimacy. The 'open method of coordination' (OMC), which was first established by the Maastricht Treaty as an instrument of 'soft law' destined for coordinating those policies for which the Union did not have a legal competence and where the Community method was not applicable, was discussed in detail (Hodson and Maher, 2001). Its main elements were tailored to fluid and flexible cooperation among Member States:

1. In certain policy domains, policy choices were to remain at the national level and European legislation was explicitly excluded.
2. In parallel, national policy measures were to be defined as matters of common interest, and efforts were to be concentrated on reaching agreement on common objectives.
3. Governments were supposed to declare themselves willing to present their own – varying – plans and ideas about 'how to deploy which instruments' for achieving the common goals.
4. The approach was built on voluntary cooperation rather than fully fledged harmonisation, and there were no formal sanctions against Member States whose performance did not match agreed-upon standards.

OMC clearly departs from the Community method of legislating through regulations and directives. Whereas the Community method is characterised by a strong role for the European Commission in the formulation (right of initiative) and execution of Community legislation, with the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (COM) being co-legislators of the last resort, OMC is rather an example of 'network governance' (Kohler-Koch, 1999).

The choice of how to achieve an agreed objective is left to the Member States. The Community method and its main actors such as the COM and the EP are sidelined and so is 'over regulation from the top'. National governments remain responsible for the adoption of specific policy solutions.

It is a truism that the background to the OMC was the obvious lack of public support for the standard European legislation. It was to be a counter-model to European governance and the distribution of power and influence as it had become well known as the 'method Monnet' in the past. Its aim was to produce legitimacy where political support for the transfer of sovereignty and competences from the national to the EU level had started to wane and traditional harmonisation no longer worked.

That such a 'directly-deliberate polyarchy', as Cohen and Sabel[10] termed it, was and still is considered a potential threat to the holders of European power and the guardians of the Treaties (i.e. the EP and the Commission). Paul Taylor argued that OMC and subsidiarity were means of diluting the *acquis* and implied the licensing of differences. However, we agree with Herman Van Rompuy, who argues that 'Often the choice is not between the Community Method and inter-governmentalism but between a European position and nothing at all.'

Notably, where there is a clear lack of convergent 'beliefs and ideas', which has been laid bare during and in the wake of the financial and economic crises in Europe, we have to acknowledge diversity of national interests as follows:

1. There are different national constraints on the policy instruments available (limited domain).
2. There is disagreement about the effects (both of their scale and nature) of specific policy changes on policy targets (differences in beliefs).
3. There are cross-country differences in the degree of (inter-)dependence (differences in spill-over effects).
4. There are different models of how national polities and societies work (model uncertainties).

It goes without saying that under such circumstances and with the traditional European model under scrutiny by a critical public, a loosely fitting governance structure like the OMC is clearly superior to the 'complex straightjacket' of binding Union law. Where 'forging the iron of an ever closer and ever more harmonised Union' no longer works, more fluid and self-determined modes of governance like the OMC will help chase the winds of a more widely varied European cooperation and integration of the future.

The principle: Subsidiarity or centralised power

Subsidiarity has become a principle, a rule for how to allocate and share powers and responsibilities between different levels of government in a more diverse and fraying Europe which is becoming increasingly elusive and under continuous fire. Today's post-crises EU may necessitate a radical departure from past institutional arrangements and processes and a governance overhaul, for which the subsidiarity principle may hold some useful guidelines.

By origin, and in its basic conception, subsidiarity is a normative recommendation, a rule for setting up institutional arrangements in such a way that those decisions, affecting peoples' lives directly, should be taken as far down the chain of social organisation as possible. A shift away from the basic unit of action is legitimate, only if welfare gains can be reaped. In this regard, subsidiarity represents a bottom-up approach: the

subsidiarity principle claims that the lower levels of authority tiers and jurisdictions (where the information is unbiased) have to take precedence over the higher ones. Or again, that certain domains of decision-shaping and decision-making should not be subject to interference from the higher ones. Close contacts and interaction between the people affected by and the people involved in a decision will thus be guaranteed. Against this backdrop Hayek argued sharply: 'With its centralism, inefficiency, excessive legalism, federalism without subsidiarity is a step towards serfdom' (Hayek, 1944).

To some extent, the discussion of the concept of subsidiarity reflects the fears and concerns that national, regional and local sovereignty will wither away, and it seems to indicate at the same time the growing reluctance and unwillingness of the grass roots to transfer more competences upwards.

One of the starting points is – as depicted above – the fear that the Brussels centre, the supranational level, would arrogate too many competences. Critics complain that Brussels has turned into a place where institutions fight over power and influence rather than solving problems for the citizens. Others have been worried that the European Union is turning federalist 'by stealth', through a push-and-pull process of policy usurpation at the supranational level and policy delegation by the Member States level. In this process the former hopes to profit from more power, the latter expect to rid themselves of unpopular decisions, the responsibility for which can be assigned to Brussels. This kind of 'scapegoating' allows political agents to avoid losing national popularity in elections.

Does this development indicate that we are approaching the limits of integration? Does this mean that the completion of the Single Market and the winding, uphill road towards an economic and political Union have unduly narrowed the leeway for Member States' policymaking? Does the lack of transparency in European policymaking make it more attractive for citizens to turn back to their regional and local roots, where politics can still be experienced in a direct way, where policies are still responsive to the citizens' preferences, and where decision-shaping and decision-making are not diffracted when passing through the prism of European institutions?

Admittedly, subsidiarity does not solve the problem of concurrent powers. However, as a *leitmotif* it may help delineate Member States' and the Union's competences and provide an appropriate context for future EU governance.

Preferenda: How to re-create trust and re-gain confidence by bringing the citizens back in

No! It is not a 'typo' as you might suspect when reading the notion '*preferenda*'. It is not about *referenda* – a vote on a ballot question in which an electorate is asked to either accept or reject a policy proposal. By introducing the concept of *preferenda* we suggest a new instrument for helping

policymakers, providing and substantiating information considered indispensable to redesign EU governance as outlined above.

The intention is to bring the citizens 'back in', thereby to re-focus on identifying the preferences and desires as well as the perceived problems people think are of paramount importance for EU activity.

What distinguishes *preferenda* from referenda is the fact that the former do not submit decisions to the people, as the latter do, but rather generate knowledge of what moves people and what they worry about. This way *preferenda* will help reduce the gap between Brussels' and Europe's general population and will help overcome the system of excessive norm production by European institutions as described above.

Some proponents of the *status quo* might argue that the Commission already carries out comprehensive stakeholder surveys and holds consultations about its initiatives, proposals and activities. Sometimes, such surveys contain in-depth qualitative analyses targeting professional stakeholders. Only rarely are general surveys of EU citizens (normally roughly 1000 per Member State) conducted.[11]

Moreover, such surveys operate *ex-post*: a Commission initiative will be set in motion on the basis of a fully fledged draft proposal, having gone through the usual channels of Commission experts and power brokers[12] and before there is any deep knowledge of what citizens want and desire. In contrast, *preferenda* enquire *ex-ante*.

Online surveys should be deployed to call upon a large number of citizens to express their ideas and preferences. This enables policymakers to establish broad-based agenda-setting and can ensure they refrain from inventing ever-new initiatives inside the corridors of the *Berlaymont*.

Preferenda as a tool is flexible, adjustable, awareness-raising and legitimacy increasing. It lends itself to covering the interface between content and contact, that is, between issues and those meant to tackle them. It thus may become a powerful part of the Social Media Community, providing insight, transparency and thought leadership.

In an emergent internet democracy the old modes of governance appear archaic. We should no longer be trying to forge the iron of traditional integration, because in so doing we are dealing with the tail end of an outdated agenda. New realities cannot be tackled by means of old concepts. Using *preferenda* and online surveys can make sure that interests, contents and communication in European governance will be set on a new foundation.

In postmodern states (Habermas) and multi-tier institutional arrangements (Scharpf) as reflected in the workings of the EU today, the old neo-functionalist patterns of policymaking no longer hold. Designing the future will require replacing them with an array of 'multi-dimensional, hyper-complex'[13] and innovative solutions. Annoyance with the present state will not suffice!

Redesigning the European dream: From transformation to a new foundation

Redesigning the European dream requires new visions, new goals and objectives, new ideas and new modes of governance. Another Europe is needed and possible. We must re-shape the EU as it presently stands and adapt it to new realities. New constellations, driving forces and technological developments cannot be coped with by means of old concepts. We do need a twenty-first century blueprint of Europe which is a 'far cry' from the 1950s and 1960s conception, as Timothy Garton Ash once put it. More than a decade ago, Werner Weidenfeld argued that we'll have to say goodbye to five EU myths permeating our past discussions: assimilation, finality, equality, transferability and homogeneity.

'The European idea', once hailed as a model for the world, is about to lose its attractiveness due to misperceptions, arrogance, ambition and insufficient self-criticism. Today we are confronted with the depletion of an ideal.

Additionally, economic crises involve costs not only in terms of money and capital but also in terms of trust and confidence in the competence and integrity of political and economic elites. Loss of confidence paired with poor reasoning and weak persuasiveness of the leaders may give rise to social instability and disillusion on the part of the citizens. Consequently political commitment is silent just when and where it is badly needed. One thing is certain: integration, without a firm foundation in the will of the peoples of Europe, will be bound to fail.

Against this backdrop we do not have to answer the question of whether more or less Europe is required in the first place, but rather which Europe we wish to go for: a Europe of free markets and prospering economies, of intellectual insight and innovation, of social inclusion and sustainability, of a broad variety of choices and lifestyles, or a Europe of bureaucracies and institutional sclerosis, a harmonised yet bloodless and encrusted Europe.

We do think that a redesign should definitely not aim at a centralised paternalistic Europe, a norms-producing bureaucratic machinery, but a Europe combining freedom, responsibility and efficiency with citizens' preferences and their desire to solve the real problems of life such as unemployment, migration, asylum, security, environment, data protection, to name just a few. We need a redesigned Europe, an 'EU 2.0', a newly tailored and delineated concept for a future EU:

1. An ***activating Union*** is supposed to provide 'help for self-help' between Member States, individuals and business, rather than trying to steer by means of funding and subsidies or top-down regulations.
2. A ***modernising EU*** is meant to break up economic and political sclerosis. Breaking new ground by means of ***innovation as a principle*** – innovation ecology as the tall order of the day.[14]

3. A ***moderating EU*** will be called upon to mediate and compromise between conflicting interests (national and sectors) and to find consensual solutions in the face of increasing heterogeneity and cleavages both between Member States and inside Member States.
4. A ***complementing EU*** will provide European public goods – those regulations and services which otherwise would not be 'produced' and which are functional prerequisites for the smooth working of economics, politics and civil society in an interdependent world.
5. A ***frame-setting EU*** will have to guarantee the rule of law, the right incentives, and thus ascertain the ability to develop stable and reliable expectations about the future.

Essentially, we need Europe more than ever. This much is indisputable. However, whether we do need 'more Europe' is still a contested issue. We do need a Europe closer to its citizens and a more diverse and flexible one. Such a Europe is possible: a Europe of diversified preferences, a new equilibrium between consolidation and new dynamics, between risk and opportunities, growth and distribution. It requires, however, a broad-based societal discourse about what kind of Europe we wish to live in 20 years from now and how this should be brought about.

We do need a grand new project – as the Single European Market once was – a project for which the Union only sets the correct framework while the hammering out of the details and policy measures is left to the individual Member States and those directly involved and affected.

What gives us hope for such a new Europe and a suitable new governance is a fact stated in Barroso's and Van Rompuy's speech in Oslo in December 2012 when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: 'Europe possesses an enormous capacity of reinventing itself!' *Sic erat scriptum*!

Notes

1. A brief internet check reveals that under 'EU and crisis' one can find more than 1000 million entries.
2. See S. Puntscher-Riekmann, A. Somek, and D. Wydra (eds.) (2013) *Is there a European Public Good?* Baden-Baden: Nomos.
3. A. Eppler and H. Scheller (eds.) (2014) *Zur Konzeptualisierung europäischer Desintegration*. Baden-Baden: Nomos. See also P. Taylor (2008) *The End of European Integration*. NY: Routledge; D. Webber (2013) How Likely is it that the EU will Disintegrate? *EJIR*.
4. On 'Permissive consensus' see L. Hooghe and G. Marks (2008) A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining. *B.J.Pol.S.*, 39: 1–23.
5. A. Giddens (2014) *Turbulent and Mighty Continent – What Future for Europe?* Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge.
6. The '*Méthode Monnet*' suggests a piecemeal approach to European integration: The EU shall act without a clearly defined final end state or grand vision; rather via partial economic interests and small incremental advances under a clearly defined

division of labour between the EU Commission, the European Parliament and the Council.

7. From an interview in the German weekly 'DerSpiegel', issue: 27 December 1999.
8. The Community method denotes the institutional functioning of the first pillar of the European Union and is characterised by (1) the Commission monopoly of the right of initiative; (2) widespread use of qualified majority voting in the Council; (3) an active role for the European Parliament; and (4) a uniform interpretation of Union law by the Court of Justice.
9. This development is clearly biased and not in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon. In Article 48 it is codified that changes in the Treaty should not deal exclusively with the *expansion* of competences and responsibilities at the EU level. They may also aim at a *reduction* of the powers passed on previously on EU institutions.
10. This is a kind of radical, participatory approach with problem-solving capacities useful under current conditions and unavailable to EU institutions. In directly deliberative polyarchy, collective decisions are made through public deliberation in arenas open to citizens who use public services, or who are otherwise regulated by public decisions. But in deciding, those citizens must examine their own choices in the light of the relevant deliberations and experiences of others facing similar problems in comparable jurisdictions or subdivisions of government. J. Cohen and Ch. Sabel (1997) Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy. *European Law Journal*, 3: 313–342.
11. Also, *Eurobarometer* special surveys and studies addressing topics such as enlargement, health, culture, IT, environment and so on cannot deliver the knowledge deliverable by *preferenda*: The sheer number of internet survey addressees (six digit figure), the low costs, the sub-sampling and so on make *preferenda* a unique instrument.
12. D.-J. Eppink (2007), a former cabinet member of a Commissioner, provides the interested reader an insider's glimpse of how the Commission works in practice in Life of a European Mandarin (Brussels Lannoo Publishers).
13. Complexity theory builds upon a variety of earlier fields of research, including the philosophy of organism, neural networks, cybernetics, General Systems Theory and a generalised theory of organisations and institutions. This breadth of influence across disciplinary boundaries makes it 'the ultimate interdisciplinary science'. B. McKelvey (1999) Complexity Theory in Organization Science: Seizing the Promise or Becoming a Fad? *Emergence*, 1: 5–32.
14. See 'High Level Group on Innovation Policy Management – Report and Recommendations', June 2013 Brussels.

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